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tence, so often attacked, is not entirely negative and thus is not ruled out as a 
support for a religious view of life. The author also points to the danger of taking 
empirical existence as necessary for the Absolute, as well as the danger of taking 
it as real, these interpretations leaving the Absolute destitute of its absoluteness. 
On the other hand, our feeling of an objective world of experiences must be 
accounted for. The author's solution is brought forth after a thorough discussion. 
The empirical has existence as a "logical possibility" (not a logical necessity), 
and this logical possibility must not be mistaken for an ontological reality. The 
Absolute alone is real in the true sense of the word. 
In the last part of the second lecture and in the third lecture Advaita is estab- 
lished as a religion, a religion of fulfillment and realization of reality. It is pointed 
out that the knowledge the seeker gets of the Absolute is revelation; that is, it is 
ontological and not epistemological. By this distinction Advaita is also shown as 
establishing a relationship between the seeker and everything the Absolute stands 
for, as well as the Absolute itself. The author here gives us an interesting discus- 
sion of the religious implications contained in the Advaitic notion of the Absolute. 
The author certainly convinces us that the metaphysical conception of the Absolute 
in Advaita can be reconciled with "the highest conception and spirit of religion," 
a lofty religion indeed. His arguments are clear on this point. It is also evident, 
however, that this "Advaitic religion" is a religion for the very few, as is the 
Advaita as a philosophy. Nonetheless, the book is well worth reading, particularly 
because of the interesting discussion of the Absolute in lecture two. The Absolute 
of Advaita has been frequently attacked by Indian theistic writers (not to mention 
Christian writers), and the author gives us some interesting examples of criticism 
based on an inadequate understanding of the Advaitic Absolute. 
The title of this book may be a little misleading. The reader should not expect 
to find an apologetic for an Advaitic religion as such, the author's purpose being 
only to show the reconcilability of the Absolute with religion. 
IvAR T. WEIERHOLT 
University of Hawaii 
Intentionality and the Problem of the Unconscious, by Lauri Rauhala. Turku: 
Turun Yliopisto, 1969. Pp. 222. (Price not given.) 
This book is meant to provide a philosophical analysis of the unconscious and of 
the disciplines traditionally concerned with the unconscious. The basis of the analy- 
sis is found in phenomenology and the philosophy of existence; the investigation is 
carried out in four parts. 
The first section (pp. 16-49) lays out the major problems in psychology as they 
bear on the unconscious, and tries to point up the need for a "metascientific," that 
is, philosophical elucidation of psychological procedures. A focus for such an 
elucidation is seen in man's transcending capacity, his ability to reach beyond his 
immediate situation mentally and nonmentally. 
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The second section (pp. 50-76) gives a historical outline of views on the uncon- 
scious, including the Eastern tradition (pp. 50-59), extending from ancient Greece 
up to Freud and Jung in the West. The third section (pp. 77-121) analyzes Freud's 
and Jung's conceptions of the unconscious. 
A systematic correlation of the problem of meaning and that of the unconscious 
is undertaken in section four (pp. 122-164). Meaning is taken in the flexible and 
complex sense of Rauhala's basic orientation, where meaning is not a given but an 
achievement(something constituted), and where the bodily and unconscious spheres 
have characteristic types of meaning. 
The last section (pp. 165-212) summarizes and expounds the new insights 
derived from the foregoing analysis and suggests ways in which these insights 
can be further developed and made practically fruitful. 
Rauhala's arguments for the need of philosophical analysis of the psychoanalytic 
concern with the unconscious refer in the main to the informal, intuitive, and 
occasionally inconsistent procedures of that discipline (pp. 28, 35-36). But such 
reference only shows that a better theory is needed, be it speculative or empirical. 
Moreover, the psychoanalyst's willingness to take each case as largely unique and 
hence as largely not susceptible to rule-governed solutions is elsewhere seen as an 
indication of the superiority of psychoanalysis over phenomenology and the philos- 
ophy of existence (pp. 151-153). 
This concession can be generalized with regard to the entire analysis provided 
by Rauhala in the following sense. While the examination of psychoanalytic theory 
and its translation and correction into phenomenological and existential terms un- 
covers many inconsistencies in the former discipline and many apposite and needed 
distinctions in the latter, the explication covers up more persistently than the ex- 
plicandum the necessity and difficulty of standards for treatment and rehabilitation. 
The normal and the abnormal cases become equally perspicuous and articulate 
in Rauhala's analysis, but the superiority of the one over the other rimainq a 
matter of labels. 
This lack of incisiveness stems from Rauhala's approach, which is not so much 
investigative and speculative as it is historical and expository. Systematically it 
operates with comparatively few and simplified terms of phenomenological and 
existential provenience. Rauhala's distinctions between amorphous, paramorphous, 
quasimorphous, and morphous meaning functions are helpful, but do not open up a 
fundamental problem. But this methodological weakness is also the book's strength. 
It assembles a great amount of pertinent material in a painstaking and intelligible 
way. Further studies in this area will benefit from it 
The discussion of the Eastern tradition culminates in the contention: "The East 
has demonstrated the reality of a supra-intentional reality .. ." (p. 59). However, 
the question whether, or what kind of, demonstration is possible in this regard is 
not even raised, and the assertion quite consistently remains an episode apart from 
one incidental reference (p. 297). 
ALBERT BORGMANN 
University of Montana 
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